

Dreaming Consciousness in Phenomenology and Depth Psychology

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Abstract

Introduction: Freud and Jung delve deep into the study of dreams and other phenomena occurring in altered states of consciousness. Edmund Husserl, the founding father of phenomenology, on the contrary, neglects mental activity in altered states of consciousness, and primarily describes mental functioning from the perspective of normal, waking consciousness.

Objectives: The purpose of this comparative study is to show that a productive dialogue might be possible between phenomenology and Freudian and Jungian psychology, in their research in mental activities occurring in altered states of consciousness.

Methods: First, the concepts of the unconscious of phenomenology and of depth psychology are compared. Then, the obstacles to the phenomenological analysis of dreams are enumerated. Afterwards, the Freudian and Jungian dream theories are contrasted. Finally, the Jungian active imagination is addressed from the vantage point of the phenomenological concept of phantasy.

Results: Although mental processes form a continuum, until the last two decades, they were treated separately in phenomenology and depth psychology. Phenomenology specialized itself in normal awake state of consciousness, in which the various functional organizations of the human mind act in concert subordinated to and controlled by a virtual center. Freud, Jung and their disciples, on the other hand, focused on states in which consciousness is cut off from the outer world (hypnosis, dreaming, psychotic hallucinations), or the subject suspends – to a certain degree – its interest in the environment (day-dreaming and active imagination).

Conclusions: The dialogue between phenomenology and the Freudian and Jungian depth psychology that has started over the past decades might significantly widen the horizon of the Husserl's science reaching at dreams, active imagination, psychedelic experiences and other products of the infinite realms of altered states of consciousness.

Keywords: Husserlian unconscious, psychoanalysis, active imagination, altered states of consciousness

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I. Introduction

One of the favorite topics of the current Descartes literature is the Cartesian concept of unconscious (see Eshleman, 2007). However, unconscious mental processes¹ were neglected by Descartes and other representatives of the 17th and 18th century philosophy. The concept of the unconscious was postulated by the early authors of German Idealism at the end of the 18th century². Starting with this era, and continuing in the beginning of the 19th century, mental phenomena free from the voluntary control of the waking Ego, as a literary topic, have been discovered by Romantic writers. Psychological phenomena, such as dreams, hypnosis, somnambulism, imagination, psychosis, melancholy, i.e. a whole spectrum of mental phenomena experienced in altered states of consciousness have been presented. Eventually, at the turn of the 19th and 20th century, Freud, Jung, and their adherents, rooted deeply in the Romantic tradition, began to examine dissociative mental phenomena systematically in a specific interpersonal situation, to be more precise, in the doctor-patient relationship.

II. The unconscious by Husserl and in depth psychology

About the same time with Freud elaborating the basic tenets of psychoanalysis, Husserl launched the movement of phenomenology. The mental acts specified by Husserl are such psychological processes that typically occur in the normal state of consciousness (NSC) and can be reflected upon. Probably this is the most important reason why Freud's name is referred to

only twice in the Husserl-texts³. Husserl essentially remains within the anthropological framework, formulated by the Cartesian tradition, which rejects unconscious mental processes⁴. *Husserl's subject* – as well as the Cartesian Ego or the mind of British Empiricists – *is a coherent entity undisturbed by dissociative functioning*⁵. Two decades later, however, from the *Bernau manuscripts (Hua XXXIII)* of 1917-1918 onward, Husserl extends his *static-descriptive phenomenology* with the analysis of time-consciousness and *genetic phenomenology*, which he considers to be the continuation of his analyses of time-consciousness^{6 7}. From then on, the periphery of attention, i.e. the perceptually confused background, is interpreted as a constitutive layer of consciousness. So, the examination of conscious mental functioning has been completed with a non-conscious sphere, the activity of which cannot be grasped directly, in its sensual reality, only inferred^{8 9}. One might say that with the emergence of the analyses of the passive synthesis phenomenology, similarly to depth psychology, it becomes a “two-level” system.

Naturally, the concept of the unconscious in depth psychology and phenomenology differs considerably. Where do these differences come from? First of all, affectivity receives less emphasis in phenomenology than in the Freudian and Jungian depth psychology. This, however, does not mean that Husserl did not recognize the importance of affectivity. With genetic phenomenology, affectivity becomes a basic constituent of intentionality for Husserl. Intentionality cannot be separated from attention – a component of awareness. Without affectivity, the spotlight of attention

¹ Leibniz is an exception in consciousness philosophy of Early Modern Times. His concept of *petites perceptions* anticipates the problematics of subliminal syntheses and the possibility of unconscious notions.

² Immediately after Kant, the concept of the unconscious explicitly appears in the thinking of Reinhold, Schulze, and Fichte, who, for example, attributes the emergence of the non-Ego to an unconscious process.

³ Both references are present in manuscripts (E III 10, p. 3; B II 3, p. 16b). The two manuscripts were written in 1934 in Kappel. These are described in detail by Smith (2010, p. 170).

⁴ Husserl is a successor of the Cartesian-Kantian tradition, a direct adherent and, at the same time, a critic of Franz Brentano's descriptive psychological program. Freud and Jung in particular are successors of the Romantic tradition. Freud's direct predecessors are Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, whereas Jung – in his early years in particular – is mainly influenced by Nietzsche (see Shamdasani, 2003).

⁵ But Husserl significantly transcends both the epistemology of early modern philosophy and the theory of the association of ideas, the most salient aspect of 18th century British philosophy. Phenomenology is founded upon the declaration of the correlation thesis, the intertwining of subject and object in perception and thinking. This means that subject and object are primarily interdependent and can only be separated artificially.

⁶ Genetic phenomenology, contrary to static phenomenology, is capable to depict a development of the Self. In this development, in an infinite process with continuous corrections, a more or less coherent Self is building up.

⁷ Horváth (2019, 2018b, 2017a,b) attempts a phenomenological approach to Self.

⁸ However, in Nicholas Smith's mind, the non-conscious sphere is also accessible to a specific self-reflection (Smith, 2010).

⁹ About the concept of the phenomenological unconscious see Torma, 2013; Horváth, 2018a,b.

would not be engaged by objects and the vibrant dynamism of figure and background would cease to exist. At last, for Husserl, similarly to Freud and Jung, affection has instinctive-sensory roots¹⁰.

In addition to the different emphasis placed on emotions, there is another major reason why the concept of the unconscious significantly differs in phenomenology and depth psychology. Freud and Jung examined mental acts in totally different states of consciousness than Husserl did.

III. The negligence of altered states of consciousness in phenomenology¹¹

William James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience* was published two years before Husserl's Gottingen Lectures in 1904–1905. In his work, James (2009, p. 349) states:

"[...] our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens; there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and, at a touch, they are there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded."

What are these other forms of consciousness and what kind of stimuli should be applied to reach them? The answer is the altered states of consciousness. At the turn of the 1870s–1880s, a hallucinogenic gas (see James, 1882; 2009/ 1902) was used as a self-experimenting tool to systematically

induce altered states of consciousness (cf. Tymocko, 1996)¹².

It is, of course, not by any means necessary for a psychologist or philosopher to use hallucinogenic substances to induce altered states of consciousness. In our daily waking-sleeping cycle, for example, altered states of consciousness occur spontaneously. Distancing from the waking state of consciousness and approaching towards sleep, we encounter radically different and more loosely organized psychological functions than our normal, waking mental activity. Freud and Jung were interested primarily in these kinds of mental phenomena. Between the middle of the 1880s and the end of the 1890s, Freud pioneers a previously uncharted path. He is passing through a series of altered states of consciousness and corresponding mental phenomena, such as hypnosis (from 1886 to ca. 1892), free association (from ca. 1892), dream (from 1895), and phantasy (from 1897). During this period, both his theories and practice are continuously refined to finally discover the theoretical and technical significance of dreams. As far as Jung is concerned, in his pre-psychoanalytic period, he was interested in trance states produced by spiritualist mediums. Later, psychotic hallucinations, dreams and other dissociative mental phenomena were studied and the existence of emotional complexes was empirically proven (see Jung, 1918). Immediately after breaking the professional relationship with Freud, Jung develops his so-called *active imagination* technique (see below) which also implies a kind of altered state of consciousness.

The fact that both Freud's and Jung's theoretical work, to a significant degree, is based on dreams and other mental phenomena connected to altered states of consciousness has had profound

¹⁰ Several contemporary phenomenologists think that Husserl does not exclude the possibility that phenomenology may address the question of the dynamic unconscious (see Kozyreva, 2018; Smith, 2010, Welsh, 2002).

¹¹ About the significance of the study of altered states of consciousness for phenomenology see Horváth, 2017a,b; Szabó, Horváth and Szummer, 2014.

¹² Both in psychology and philosophy, James (1882, 2009) was the one who acted as a pioneer in the research into psychedelics. His interest laid in how psychedelics could potentially intensify phantasy, especially religious imagination. In the 1920s, psychiatrists and Gestalt psychologists began to examine how mescaline could affect perception. During the 1930s, Walter Benjamin (1927-34/ 2006) (see Wolin, 1994) and Ernst Bloch (1954-1959/ 1986) tasted hashish and mescaline. In 1935, Jean-Paul Sartre (1978) also tried mescaline. Sartre's later friend, Maurice Merleau-Ponty used Sartre's notes about his psychedelic experience, and also other examples of mescaline experience in his main work, *Phenomenology of Perception*, a decade later. Henri Bergson (1896/ 1999), Herbert Marcuse (1969), Michel Foucault (1970) and Rush Rhees (see Drury, 1981) also proposed psychedelics as reasonable means to expand the limits of the mind, albeit Bergson and Rhees never used them (see Sjöstedt, 2015). In the last two decades, a new wave of psychedelic research has begun in the field of philosophy. There is a handful of researchers analyzing psychedelic experiences using the frameworks of Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Shanon, 2002, 2003, 2010; Lundborg, 2012; Szabó et al., 2014; Szummer et al., 2017; Horváth et al., 2017; Horváth, 2012a,b; Horváth and Szabó, 2012; Horváth, 2016).

theoretical consequences. The less the control and reflexivity characteristic to NSC occur, the more probably dissociative, autonomous mental processes appear, which are capable of freeing themselves from the unifying force of the waking subject. Most certainly, both Freud and Jung were prompted by the characteristics of dreaming radically different from those of waking life, in such an extent that they divided the mental realm up into two “levels of consciousness”. On the other hand, the mental acts – with the important exception of phantasy and apart from his sporadic dream analyses – pinned down by Husserl, are mental phenomena emerging in, underlying or generating normal, waking state of consciousness, including the phenomena of falling asleep and awakening. Husserl splits mental life into the duality of waking and sleeping states, although he is only interested in the waking state, which is organized around perception. In other words, Husserl takes consciousness as a starting point, affected by impressions from the environment. As opposed to Husserl, for Freud and Jung, the baseline state is self-affection that occurs in the altered state of consciousness of dreaming. During dreaming, the stimulating objects of the mind are, first, memory remnants, second, actual somatic stimuli of the dreaming body.

IV. Obstacles of the phenomenological approaches to dreaming

In Husserl’s vast *oeuvre*, dreams are only of peripheral significance¹³. He deals with the dream phenomenon sporadically and to the extent of a couple of pages only¹⁴. Husserl’s negligence is not a surprise since the phenomenological analysis of dreams is hindered by numerous obstacles. A dreaming subject does not possess the reflexive consciousness compared to an awakened one. For this reason, the dream

phenomenon cannot be grasped directly through phenomenological analysis, just through the prism of recollection. Though the ability of recalling dreams can be improved, sometimes it falters, and the individual skills vary considerably, too. Secondly, during the recollection process, verbalizing the visual, non-linear, non-linguistic, non-discursive structure of dreams after awakening might be a cumbersome task for the waking consciousness. As a consequence, it is very difficult to determine to what extent the dream being remembered is the product of the original experience and to what extent of Freud’s *secondary elaboration* process. Finally, it must also be taken into account that the dream (dreaming) is an umbrella term for heterogeneous mental phenomena. During sleep, the activity of the subject organizing our dreams is enormously fluctuating. As a result, dreams vary significantly along the spectrum, comprising misty, fuzzy dream fragments and elaborate dreams with clear narrative structure. However, there are well-structured, perfectly elaborated dreams similar to waking imagination, occasionally to discursive thinking, even to works of art. Additionally, the strange phenomenon of lucid dreaming also exists when the *hypnonaut* is capable – to a certain degree – of steering the dream process in the desired direction. The heterogeneity of dreams might be one of the reasons why dream concepts significantly differ in classical and contemporary phenomenology.

The obstacles mentioned before are significant, but not insurmountable. Since dreams are part of mental life, phenomenology cannot neglect them. Classical authors of phenomenology after Husserl were strongly interested in the topic of dreaming, in spite of all the difficulties mentioned above. Several followers of Husserl, namely Eugen Fink (1966), Theodor Conrad (1968) and Jean Héring (1947) attempted to analyze

¹³ He basically uses the term “dreaming” in a negative sense, contrasting dreaming with the authentic field of research of a phenomenologist, i.e. the awake life of transcendental subjectivity states (Zippel, 2016, p. 181). Among today’s phenomenologists, Dieter Lohmar (2008, p. 160) and Jean-Luc Nancy (2007) take a similar point of view to Husserl. What does Husserl’s aversion to dreams originate from? In Husserl’s mind, though dreams are creatures of our own imagination, to the dreamer they appear as *perceptual reality*. Dreaming, along with hallucination and illusion, differs from phantasy mainly in that it appears in the way of perception to the dreamer, that is, as real and present. Phantasy, on the other hand, appears as illusory for the subject. According to Husserl, the everyday usage of this term, when it implies close relation between quasi-perceptual experience of dreaming and phantasy (day-dreaming, *Tagtraum*), is misleading (Husserl, 2005, p. 6-7). “The world of reality *almost* disappears when we abandon ourselves to these fantasies, but it still subtly makes us conscious of its presence, mild awareness of its own illusory character always discolours phantasy” (Husserl, 2005, p. 44 –emphasis in the original).

¹⁴ According to Zippel (2016, p. 181) Husserl treats the dream phenomenon in the following four texts, particularly in Husserliana Vol. XXII; in his letter to Héring; in a manuscript dated to the spring of 1933; and, finally, in a text that was published in Husserliana Vol. XXXIX, App. XVII, in 1920.

dreams, and Sartre (1972) and Merleau-Ponty (1968)¹⁵ showed great concern about the subject, too¹⁶. At the same time, the different phenomenological conceptions of dreams do not converge; agreement among authors is just occasional. After the approaches of dreaming of classical phenomenology, in the last two decades a certain renewed interest in dreams can be observed¹⁷. However, we still cannot talk about a systematic phenomenological investigation of dreams, neither about coherent approaches made of dreaming. The features of dreaming are defined by diverse authors in different ways. In spite of this, a relative agreement has been taking shape in connection with the basic characteristics of dreaming. According to this, the dreaming subject splits into two: a dreaming self and an imaginary dream-self. The dream-self sinks into the dreamworld created by the dreaming self and reckons this imaginary world true. The dream-self is passive, does not possess the organizing dynamism of the awake self; its relation to time and space changes radically. When I dream, apart from lucid dreams, I do not have reflexive consciousness *about* my dreaming process, since at that moment I would wake up. Then again, I have a “pre-reflexive consciousness in the dream and this peculiar consciousness belongs to the dream-self” (Warren, 2012, p. 472). The dream-self is able to feel fear, joy, contentment or disappointment, etc.

V. Freud and Jung on dreams

Freud writes his first detailed dream analysis (of the famous *Irma*-dream) in the summer of 1895. From that time on, he focuses his theoretical and practical interest on dreaming as an altered state to be the *viaregia* to the unconscious. According to Freud, a dream is a hallucinatory wish-fulfillment, which is – most of the time – sexual in nature. A clear distinction is made between dream thought (*latent dream*) and dream content (*manifest dream*). The manifest dream, claims Freud, is only a front, façade, distorted, abbreviated, and misconstrued translation of a dream thought represented mainly in visual images. Materials of memories, specifically those of the previous day, are

utilized in manifest dreams. In the sleep state, while the access to motility is blocked, the Ego may reduce its repressive efforts controlling instinctual urges of the Id. The repressive forces of the Ego are still operational, though in the weaker form of the *dream-censorship*. “Dream distortion is the thing which makes the dream seem strange and incomprehensible to us. [...] Dream distortion is the product of the dream work.”¹⁸ *Nota bene*, displacement, condensation, and other mechanisms of the dream-work hypothesized by Freud have a *dual function*. On the one hand, they serve the instant hallucinatory wish-fulfillment. On the other, the dream-work also makes use of them to bypass the repressive dream-censorship.

Freud states that the latent dream – which is much longer-lasting and coherent than the manifest dream – can be accessed by getting the patient to make associations to certain elements of the manifest dream. Jung, however, similarly to the *daseinsanalysts*¹⁹, regards this technique as absurd. In his view, the strangeness of dreams is a primary feature of the dream-producing mental processes, not a consequence of dream-censorship:

“I was never able to agree with Freud that the dream is a «façade» behind which its meaning lies hidden – a meaning already known but maliciously, so to speak, withheld from consciousness. To me, dreams are a part of nature, which harbors no intention to deceive, but expresses something as best it can, just as a plant grows or an animal seeks its food as best as it can. These forms of life, too, have no wish to deceive our eyes, but we may deceive ourselves because our eyes are shortsighted. [...] I regarded the unconscious, and dreams, which are its direct exponents, as natural processes to which no arbitrariness can be attributed, and above all no legerdemain. I knew no reasons for the assumption that the tricks of consciousness can be extended to the natural processes of the unconscious” (Jung, 1989, p. 161-162).

Jean Piaget, who went into an eight-month Jungian analysis with Sabina Spielrein (see Bringuier, 1980), in Geneva in 1921-1922, is of the same opinion. He states about Freud’s dream-censorship concept the following:

¹⁵ Authors listed above, in fact, do not respond to each other’s writings, except for Héring, who regularly exchanged letters with Husserl about dreaming (Husserl, 1993). This correspondence is being compiled by Ferencz-Flatz (2011). Besides, Héring also referred to Sartre and Fink in connection with dreaming. Then again, Husserl was not willing to comment upon Fink difference of opinion about dreaming, that had been explained in Fink’s thesis, though Husserl’s was Fink’s supervisor.

¹⁶ Worth mentioning among the classics Jan Patočka (1991) and Alfred Schütz (1969).

¹⁷ Cf. Morley (1999), Sepp (2010), Ferencz-Flatz (2011), De Warren (2012, 2016), Zipel (2017), Iribarne (2003).

¹⁸ Freud, 1921, p. 110.

¹⁹ See Helting, 2007, p. 170-177; Krétics and Kóváry, 2017.

“[...] Freud gave two successive explanations of symbolism, a fact which is particularly interesting to us because the role of censorship was involved. The first explanation makes all the symbolic mechanisms depend on censorship, the symbol being no more than the idea of disguise. Later on, however, probably under the influence of Silberer, Adler and particularly Jung, Freud recognized that symbolism also constituted a primitive language, but maintained that it was disguise as well as language” (Piaget, 1951, p. 191-192).

The influences reported by Piaget can be traced well in the subsequent editions of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. In the 2nd and 3rd edition (1908 and 1911), the “Typical dreams” section is gradually expanded. Freud’s foreword to the 3rd edition clearly reflects Jung’s influence:

“I will even venture to predict the directions in which further editions of this book – should there be a demand for them – may diverge from previous editions. Dream-interpretation must seek a closer union with the rich material of poetry, myth, and popular idiom, and it must deal more faithfully than has hitherto been possible with the relations of dreams to the neuroses and to mental derangement” (Freud, 2008, viii.).

In 1914, in the 4th edition, the majority of the material included in the “Typical dreams” section becomes an independent section titled “Representation in Dreams by Symbols – Some Further Typical Dreams”. In *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, published in 1916-1917, Freud deals with the problematics of symbols for the last time (Lecture X), however, he makes no modifications to the content of the concept put forward in the 4th edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

In conclusion, according to Jung, the introduction of the concept of dream-censorship is absolutely unnecessary and misleading, in Piaget’s words, “tautological”. The difference in nature between the unconscious processes of dreams and the conscious processes is the *primary quality* of the unconscious. Freud’s concept of dream-censorship is closely related to the fact that he attaches overriding importance to the sexual instinct. Freud is not concerned about experience as such, but a *special kind* of experience, that is, craving and wish-fulfilment. The Freudian Id never stops

yearning for fulfillment, like an addict. Because of that, the Ego and the Super-ego have to make significant and constant efforts to keep restraints on the Id. Consequently, in contrast with Jung (and Husserl), Freud places a *structural division* between the unconscious and the conscious. In this regard, the Jungian and Husserlian concepts of the unconscious are similar, since they are not engendered by the dynamics of the wish-repression conflict.

VI. The phenomenology of active imagination

Jung seeks to map the characteristics of fantasies emerging from the unconscious, with the same precision as Husserl attempts to fully grasp the richness of perception²⁰. However, the mythopoetic formations of the unconscious are far too volatile and variable to be perceived as objects are perceived in the outer reality, e.g. a tree or a cube (Husserl’s examples). The archetypal images have symbolic layers of meaning and, according to Jung, their ultimate reference can never be established, only approached by replacing one analogy indefinitely with another one; Jung calls this method amplification. After his split with Freud, Jung develops the technique of *active imagination*, in order to bring the self-movement of the search for meaning to the surface, to give voice to the unconscious²¹. From a phenomenological point of view, this might be considered as the most remarkable part of Jung’s practical work.

While laying the foundations of psychoanalysis, Freud also sought to find a solution to his own agonizing problems. Similarly to Freud, Jung’s original aim with active imagination was to help himself articulate and release his own emotions, “clogged up” in complexes.

“To the extent that I managed to translate the emotions into images, that is to say, to find the images which were concealed in the emotions, I was inwardly calmed and reassured. Had I left those images hidden in the emotions, I might have been torn to pieces by them. There is a chance that I might have succeeded in splitting them off; but in that case I would inexorably have fallen into a neurosis and so been ultimately destroyed by them anyhow. As a result of my experiment I learned how helpful it can be, from the therapeutic

²⁰ The pioneer of Jungian psychology’s phenomenological analysis in Hungarian literature is Lajos Horváth. (See Horváth, 2012a,b; Horváth & Horváth, 2012).

²¹ In his *Dreams, memories, reflections*, Jung writes: “It was during Advent of the year 1913 December 12, to be exact, that I resolved upon the decisive step. I was sitting at my desk once more, thinking over my fears. Then I let myself drop” (Jung, 1989, p. 179).

point of view, to find the particular images which lie behind emotions” (Jung, 1989, p. 177)²².

What is so intriguing about the transformation of affection for phenomenology? An intriguing observational boundary situation is provided by active imagination. This is like hypnagogia, where the visual modality of the unconscious plays the determinant role. The ability of reflection is retained in this state of consciousness, but the working mode of conceptual thinking is no more dominant. So, active imagination unites the reflective capability of the waking state and the variability and fluidity of dream-activity. Here, the objective is to observe and express in creative kinetic or visual forms (such as drawing, painting, sculpting, or dance), germs of phantasy popping up spontaneously below the threshold of NSC.

On the basis of Husserl’s work we can distinguish between two kinds of imaginative activity, namely the consciously directed *imagination* and the voluble, whimsical *phantasy* (see Husserl, 2005). The Husserlian imagination is a voluntarily controlled, conscious mental activity, governed by the subject, similar to looking at an image. Imagination, in the Husserlian sense, has a concrete object and it is anchored to the present. Phantasy, on the contrary, has neither a concrete object, nor time. Here, the subject is much more passive than in the case of imagination or the view of an image. The visions of phantasy are difficult to grasp, because they are wobbly in nature, a careless step and they tend to freeze into concrete images. The Jungian active imagination also balances on the thin line between imagination and phantasy in the Husserlian sense. From a phenomenological perspective, the process can be defined as one in which the consciously controlled imagination gradually extends over to manifestations of a voluble phantasy.

Active imagination implies a precarious state of mind, as we, for the most part, have long been lost in fantasies. In other words, by the time we are truly able to perceive the volatile and shadowy sensory formations of phantasy, we have long lost our ability of reflection. Jung approaches this particular fragility of active imagination, not from a phenomenological, but a clinical point of view. He enumerates three wrong paths a therapist should always be aware of: (i) free association performed on the phantasy material distracts us from seeing the affective essence and the whole process is

rendered ineffective; (ii) the subject gets caught up in phantasy activities but does not integrate their meaning into his/ her personality; (iii) the integrity of the conscious Ego is jeopardized by the upwelling unconscious material; so, there is a risk of psychotic breakdown. Jung saw clearly the danger of a psychotic collapse, but he felt he has no other choice than to undertake risk:

“In order to grasp the fantasies which were stirring in me ‘underground’, I knew that I had to let myself plummet down into them, as it were. I felt not only violent resistance to this but a distinct fear. For I was afraid of losing command of myself and becoming a prey to the fantasies and, as a psychiatrist, I realized only too well what that meant. After prolonged hesitation, however, I saw that there was no other way out. I had to take the chance, had to try to gain power over them; for I realized that if I did not do so, I ran the risk of their gaining power over me” (Jung, 1989, p. 178).

The power of these visionary fantasies comes from their ability to disconnect subjects from the outer reality, creating a solipsistic world. What previously occurred as a vague, shadowy visual, auditory, or perhaps tactile sensation, in an extreme case might turn into a vivid vision, with the autonomy of the fantasies of psychedelic experiences or psychotic hallucinations²³.

From a phenomenological perspective, it is obvious that Jung plays with perspectives fitting the emerging fantasies into different contextual horizons. Archetypal patterns, such as the motives of tree, child, mother, hero, myths, dreams, paintings and drawing, psychotic hallucinations, etc. are shown up. Naturally, as we mentioned previously, the observation of prolific phantasy images cannot be directly correlated to the perception of discrete objects of the outer reality described by Husserl. However, the activity of the psyche creating forms and meaning can be observed both in perception and phantasy activities. Jung’s monumental work exploring the significance of archetypal symbols suggests that the efforts of contemporary phenomenology grasping phantasy might be completed with the analytic psychology of affection-transformation.

VII. Conclusions

Although mental processes form a continuum, until the last two decades, they were treated separately

²² “I wrote these fantasies down, first in the Black Book; later, I transferred them to the Red Book, which I also embellished with drawings” (Jung, 1989, fn. 188).

²³ Psychedelic visions are treated in detail elsewhere (cf. Horváth et al., 2017; Szummer et al., 2017).

in phenomenology and depth psychology. Phenomenology specialized itself in the normal awake state of consciousness, in which the various functional organizations of the human mind act in concert subordinated to and controlled by a virtual center. Freud, Jung and their disciples, on the other hand, focused on states in which consciousness is cut off from the outer world (hypnosis, dreaming, psychotic hallucinations), or the subject suspends – to a certain degree – its interest in the environment (day-dreaming and active imagination). Husserl's starting point is perception, so, as it were, works his way inward and, with the exception of phantasy, attempts to comprehend memory, image consciousness, and further mental acts based on the perception theory. Freud and Jung take the opposite path assuming that phantasy and psychological and psychosomatic symptoms, jokes, parapraxes, and other mental phenomena can be understood, based on dreams and other products of altered states of consciousness. With this view, they were able to break out from the reflective space narrowly defined by Descartes and the early modern philosophers. An archaic sphere of elemental forces was shown that reveals itself mainly in dreams, myths, a great variety of mental dysfunctions, etc. that lies hidden, underneath the activity of the conscious mind.

For Husserl, the dream is not subject to phenomenological analysis, but Husserl's disciples have addressed the dream phenomenon. Phenomenology and the observations of Freud and Jung fit into each other in an additional manner. The dialogue between phenomenology and depth psychology concerning altered states of consciousness holds out promises of mutual benefits. Depth psychology can lean on the fine-grained descriptions of phenomenology. As for phenomenology, it can make use of the empiric material which has been collected by depth psychologists, and their theoretical recognitions in connection of dreaming, active imaginations and phantasy.

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